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EXPANSION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
JURISDICTION AS A MEANS TO PROVIDE
MORE ADEQUATE REMEDIES TO
VICTIMS OF MASS TORTS
CARL

L. BUCKI·

With each technological advance, humankind encounters new
risks of injury and hann. Although the benefits of these advances may
fully justify the risks, and may even create a higher overall level of
safety, the world nonetheless faces specific dangers whose potential
scope and severity are unparalleled. A single tortious act may cause
death for thousands, as when lethal chemicals were released from a
factory at Bhopal, India in December 1984. 1 Contaminants from nu
clear and chemical sources may produce long-tenn environmental
dangers whose impact is broad and severe, but unpredictable. Even
such innocent conduct as the distribution of an FDA-approved drug
may create a DES horror which continues to grow after 25 years.2
For victims and tortfeasors alike, unique challenges arise from the
sheer magnitude of damages that derive from mass torts. The purpose
of this essay is to examine the remedies which should be available to
these victims, and to suggest a solution to the inadequacies that are
inherent in the current system of remedies.
Mass torts impact not only upon tort victims and tortfeasors, but
also upon society in general. From all three of these perspectives, cur
rently available remedies are grossly inadequate.
From the perspective of an injured party, legal remedies are ade
quate only if they pennit both the procurement of a fair judgment and
the collection of that judgment. After some mass torts, plaintiffs can
easily identify the party who is proximately responsible for their inju
ries. For example, when an airplane crashes, one can prepare a com
plaint that adequately recites the cause of action against known
defendants and discovery techniques will verify whether the list of de
•
1.

Partner, Cohen Swados Wright Hanifin Bradford & Brett, Buffalo, New York.
See Robert D. McFadden, Indian Disaster. Chronicle ofa Nightmare, NEW YORK
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1984, at A-I.
2. For a description of the problems associated with the drug DES, see Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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fendants is sufficiently comprehensive. However, in many circum
stances, the only certainty is that the plaintiff has been injured.
Although chemical or other contamination may pose identifiable
health risks, it is far more difficult to prove that one's exposure is prox
imately responsible for a particular health problem. Even if one can
show proximate cause, he or she may be unable to identify the
tortfeasor. For instance, in the case of DES, existing medical records
may fail to disclose the manufacturer of the drug which was actually
ingested. 3 Moreover, when the injury is ultimately discovered, the
statute of limitations may bar recovery.
In· short, modem torts frequently entail problems in establishing
certain traditional requirements for tort liability. Particularly burden
some are proof of proximate cause and restrictions on the tolling of the
statute of limitations. Although certain jurisdictions have found solu
tions favorable to tort victims,4 any inconsistency of approach will
promote forum shopping and the expensive litigation of conflict of law
issues.
However, the primary impediment to the realization of an ade
quate remedy for mass torts is not the ability to obtain a judgment, but
rather, the inability to satisfy that judgment. When a single defendant
is responsible for thousands of severe injuries, a meaningful recovery
may easily exceed the most generous insurance coverage, as well as
any equity of a highly solvent tortfeasor. Moreover, many mass
tortfeasors may have maintained minimal or no insurance coverage, or
have minimal net worth, or may have even ceased doing business. As
tute business people who can identify ventures that entail a high risk of
mass injury, will either segregate those activities into poorly funded
corporations, or abandon such activity to others who have minimal
financial responsibility. Thus, inevitably, the perpetrators of mass
torts will tend to be entities that lack the means to provide adequate
recovery for claimants.
The current tort system. is also inadequate from the perspective of
defendants of mass claims. Generally, American courts have adopted
3. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. The plaintiff in this case knew she had been
injured as a result of DES ingested by her mother during her pregnancy, but did not know
which of several manufacturers had caused her injury.
4. For example, in Sindell, the California high court developed the theory of market·
share allocation to compensate victims when the tortfeasor cannot be identified. Sindell,
607 P.2d at 937-38. Another reform has been the advent of the "discovery rule" in profes
sional malpractice cases, whereby the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has
discovered that he or she has been tortiously injured. See, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 166-67 (5th ed. 1984).
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the view stated in 1681 by the English court in Lambert v. Bessey, S
that "the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the
loss and damage of the· party suffering."6 Thus, the degree of moral
culpability will not normally affect the defendant's financial exposure.
Absent the imposition of punitive damages, defendants exhibiting a
history of consistent recklessness will encounter liability only for the
damages inflicted. These damages may be limited due either to sheer
luck or to the timely intervention of policing agencies. By contrast, a
responsible and conscientious entity may face damages having no rela
tionship to the character of its conduct. Negligence of a subcontractor
or parts supplier may be imputed to an otherwise innocent manufac
turer or servicer.7 Even in this era of comparative liability, defendants
generally remain jointly and severally liable for. all damages, and enjoy
only a right of contribution from other tortfeasors.8 Accordingly, a
tortfeasor who is only five percent responsible for an injury, must sat
isfy the entire claim, including whatever portion may be attributable
to insolvent co-defendants. 9
Even if an entity is never named as a defendant in a mass tort
claim, it will nonetheless encounter the burden of insurance premiums
that are inflated by reason of such exposure. Admittedly, the risk of
mass tort liability does not supply a complete explanation for the ex
plosion in liability premiums. Also, from the victims' perspective,
such insurance coverage may be inadequate. The potential for mass
tort liability, however, does create a threshold risk with respect to the
amount of coverage that does exist. Accordingly, that threshold risk
must be accounted for in any calculation of appropriate premium
levels.
Responsible suppliers and manufacturers can potentially incur li
abilities that bear no relationship either to any specific conduct or to
their general level of compliance with standards of safety. The pros
pect of mass tort liability, therefore, creates a drain on business profits.
Unfortunately for victims, businesses frequently avoid this burden by
83 Eng. Rep. 220 (T. Raym. 1681).
6. Id. at 221.
7. See KEETON, supra note 4 § 71 at 570.
8. See generally 74 AM. JUR. 20 Torts § 73 (1974).
9. This result occurs due to the common-law principle of joint and several liability.
Under this principle, a tort victim injured by more than one tortfeasor can recover all
damages incurred from a single defendant, even if that tortfeasor is only minimally respon
sible for the injury. See Note, Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A System
atic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 628, 635 (1988). The trend in tort reform is to limit joint and several
liability, especially in comparative negligence states. [d. at 636-37.
5.
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failing to maintain either insurance or an adequate level of
capitalization.
Finally, and most importantly, the current system of remedies for
victims of mass torts is inadequate from the perspective of society at
large. With few exceptions, mass torts arise from activities which are
both beneficial to, and desired by society. Even when risks are avoida
ble, society sometimes prefers not to incur the cost of eliminating that
risk. For example, airplane disasters occur either because society pre
fers air transportation over the elimination of unavoidable risks in fiy
ing, or because society is unwilling to incur the cost of enforcing
absolute compliance with safety standards. Consciously or not, soci
ety has chosen to enjoy the benefits of products and services that are
associated with significant risk, such as the products of hazardous
wastes. Meanwhile, society assumes that a free market place will ulti
mately satisfy market demand for products that entail risk from either
their use or production. This assumption is not necessarily accurate,
as the risk of tort liability may force a manufacturer to avoid produc
tion of a dangerous product. When that production entails sophisti
cated processes, the market place may be unable to offer alternative
sources. From the perspective of society, therefore, the status quo
may threaten the regular procurement of the benefits that society
desires, while permitting a haphazard and undesirable distribution of
the resulting burden.
Ultimately, mass torts represent a burden that is imposed, in
whole or in part, upon the tort victim, the tortfeasor, or society. To
the extent that adequate tort compensation is either unavailable or not
recoverable, individual victims will assume first hand the burden of
those underlying risks which society has allowed. The imposition of
tort liability merely shifts that burden from victim to tortfeasor.
Whether or not liability can be imposed upon a tortfeasor, society
usually assumes at least some portion of the tort burden. When con
tamination was discovered in the Love Canal area of Niagara Falls, for
example, the State of New York provided direct relief to the tort vic
tims by agreeing to purchase the affected properties. \0 As prospective
tortfeasors, drug companies obtained federal relief from potential lia
bilities arising from the distribution of a swine fiu vaccine during the
mid-1970s. 11 Such complete transfers of liability are unusual, however.
More typical is a partial, de facto transfer of cost. Uncompensated
tort victims will frequently tum to the state for medical and other
10.
11.

7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (1988).

BRITANNICA

516 (15th ed. 1989).
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care. When indigency results, society will bear the cost of public
assistance. Ultimately, tortfeasors will also recover from society at
least part of any assumed liability. This assumption may be built di
rectly into the cost of a tortfeasor's product, or more indirectly, into
price adjustments that reflect higher premiums for liability insurance.
Under the status quo, society does not follow any consistent or
logical path in its assumption of some or all of the cost and burden of
every mass tort. One might hope that in most cases, disaster compen
sation would become a cost of doing business, one which is disbursed
to society through liability insurance premiums that are ultimately re
flected in prices for all goods and services. Unfortunately, this ideal is
frequently not achieved. At times, government will directly assume
financial responsibility on behalf of society. In many instances, how
ever, such burdens are spread, helter skelter, to innocent victims and
their families. Victims may be rendered insolvent, thereby forcing so
ciety to assume the expense of assuring their minimal welfare. Cer
tainly, society has not accepted any consistent approach that will
guarantee a just distribution of the burdens created by mass torts.
Such random inconsistency necessarily means that society fails to at
tain the ideal result in all circumstances.
The imposition of a burden is justified only by the attainment of
some greater benefit. One may accept mass torts as an unfortunate
product of technological advances. The status quo, however, fails to
assure those benefits, and may even place them in jeopardy. The po
tentialliability arising from a mass disaster may easily exceed the pol
icy limits of any insurance coverage, and force an otherwise solvent
tortfeasor into insolvency. For example, the fear of such a result
caused a severe decline in the price of Union Carbide's stock immedi
ately after the Bhopal chemical leak. 12 If society values a particular
enterprise, it should not allow that enterprise to be destroyed by an
unaffordable tort recovery. Of course, a disastrous incident may in
itself reveal a previously unrecognized risk which society is not willing
to accept knowingly. But if the risk was previously justifiable, it may
continue to be justified even after a tragic incident. At present, a tort
suit seeks to establish liability and damages, and does not purport to
determine whether the benefit of that enterprise will justify its contin
ued operation. It is illogical for a society to accept the risk of a partic
ular enterprise, and thereafter, to allow the destruction of that
12.

See Vartanig G. Vartan, Market Place: Union Carbide and Insurance,
Dec. 12, 1984, at 10.

YORK TIMES,

NEW
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enterprise without perfonning a critical analysis of whether those risks
warrant continued operation in light of desired benefits.
In summary, the remedies available for mass torts are inadequate,
not only from a victim's perspective, but also from that of the
tortfeasor and society in general. To the extent that risks exist, society
should choose either to eliminate those risks, or to assure fair compen
sation to innocent victims. Although society should critically analyze
its continued acceptance of all risks in the context of any new disas
trous event, it is logically inconsistent to permit an enterprise to be
destroyed in the event that an acceptable risk ultimately results in
harm.
One begins to develop a proposal for reform by identifying the
principles and objectives of an ideal system of remedies. I suggest that
any comprehensive reform should encompass the following
considerations:
1. Society should provide fair compensation to victims of mass
torts. Since society benefits from the activities associated with disas
ters, society should assure an appropriate assumption of any resulting
burdens. Tort law is premised on the theory that victims are entitled
to compensation for injuries received.13 If one accepts this premise,
then it is contradictory for society to allow a theoretical basis for re
covery without also providing access to resources sufficient to satisfy
that right of recovery. Innocent victims should obtain a recovery that
is based on the wrongfulness of the tortfeasor's conduct, rather than
on the depth of that tortfeasor's pocketbook. Adequate compensation
satisfies our concepts ofjustice and fair play, and is consistent with the
objective of preventing indigency.
An underlying principle of fair compensation should be to elimi
nate artificial barriers that preclude recovery for reasons beyond the
victim's control. For this reason, the statute of limitations should be
tolled pending discovery of a wrongful injury. Some source of recov
ery should be available even when one cannot locate a solvent defend
ant, or when a victim is unable to isolate the responsible party from
among a number of possible tortfeasors.
2. Society should hold tortfeasors accountable for their conduct.
By holding tortfeasors accountable for their reckless or negligent acts,
one creates an incentive for achieving safety and for minimizing risks.
The degree of accountability, however, must bear a reasonable rela
tionship to the degree of culpability. Thus, it seems inappropriate to
impose joint and several liability upon an entity that has only remote
13.

KEETON,

supra note 4, § 4 at 20.
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responsibility for the injury. Furthermore, although a statute of limi
tations should not operate to the detriment of one suffering a still un
discovered injury, society may still desire to give tortfeasors an
opportunity to put their pasts behind them. This is particularly appro
priate in the corporate context, where the current management may
have no relationship to those in charge at the time of events that oc
curred far beyond the normal statute of limitations, absent tolling.
3. The imposition of damages should not be allowed to destroy
those enterprises which entail risks that society needs or desires to as
sume. For a particular defendant, large judgments in excess of insur
ance coverage may result in liquidation. Meanwhile, the potential for
such liability will force other reputable businessmen to abandon cer
tain endeavors. When risky endeavors are desirable, society should
structure remedies that recognize and accommodate a need for the
continued performance of the task at hand.
4. To maximize benefits available to victims of mass torts, an
ideal system should minimize transactional costs. In tort litigation, a
substantial portion of any recovery is usually consumed by insurance
overhead, attorneys' fees and other expenses associated with proving
liability and damages. Such expenses may well be justified by the risk
of litigation and by requirements for proof of a unique cause of action.
But with certain mass torts, liability may not be at issue. In fact, the
principle of collateral estoppel can operate to extend a finding of liabil
ity to factually similar cases. 14 In such instances, circumstances may
warrant steps to reduce transactional costs that would otherwise be
incurred.
5. Any program must prioritize the application of limited re
sources. Amidst budgetary pressures at all levels of government, it is
certainly unrealistic to propose any comprehensive governmental
guarantee of indemnification. Nor should we resort to a pro-rata dis
tribution among all creditors. Rather, I submit that society has suffi
cient ability to set priorities. For example, society may appropriately
adopt a scheme that reimburses medical expenses and the cost to re
pair property damage; that sets a schedule for reimbursement of per
sonal injury claims; and that prioritizes those scheduled amounts over
14. See Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 63 (1988). Professor Ratliff explains the effect of collateral estoppel in tort cases in
this way: "If a plaintiff establishes in Case 1 that the roll bar on a four-wheel drive Blaster
is defective, subsequent plaintiffs who were not parties to Case 1 can hold Blaster Company
to that finding." Id. at 65. Professor Rattliff goes on to discuss the limitations of collateral
estoppel in reducing tort litigation, since, although the defendant is bound by a finding of
liability, the plaintiff has a due process right to try the issue. Id.
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claims for pain and suffering. The wrongful death claims of certain
dependents may be accorded priority over all other claims.
Any proposal for mass tort remedies must withstand critical anal
ysis from the perspectives of effectiveness and workability. First, to be
effective, a proposal must foster assumed goals and principles, such as
the five identified above. As with any set of competing objectives,
some trade-offs are inevitable. When one accords more value to the
survival of beneficial enterprises, he or she inevitably diminishes the
extent to which that enterprise is held accountable for its culpable
conduct.
Second, the proposal must be workable, and to be workable it
must be affordable. To achieve a workable program, it may be neces
sary to compromise the perfect attainment of certain desired objec
tives. Let us assume that the government cannot afford to guarantee
all compensation normally awarded to tort victims. Proposals for the
payment of compensation must not impose excessive burdens upon
either governmental budgets or upon the contributors to any special
public fund. At least initially, fiscal considerations will probably re
quire that any proposal limit its focus only to remedies for mass torts.
Scholars and commentators have offered many proposals for re
form of the tort system. IS Most of these proposals are steeped in con
troversy, in that they contemplate a change either in the linkage
between fault and recovery, or in the traditional methods for establish
ing liability. Pending resolution of these philosophical issues, many
tort victims can look only to potentially insolvent or underinsured
tortfeasors for recovery. Meanwhile, for manufacturers, suppliers,
and other potential tortfeasors, an inadvertent or unavoidable event
leading to mass injury may create liability so far in excess of resources
that the inevitable result is either liquidation or a petition for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code. 16
At the present time, bankruptcy provides not only less than com
plete remedies for tort victims, but also generally inadequate relief for
tortfeasors. For victims, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession
can only distribute those assets of the estate that are available after
administrative expenses are deducted. Although the automatic stay
15. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481 (1992); W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis':· A
Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. Q. 459 (1992); Symposium, The
Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701 (1992); Henry J. Reske, Study:
Quayle Was Right . .. And Wrong, 6 W. Va. Law. 11 (1992).
16.

11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).

1993]

EXPANSION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION

265

provided by the Bankruptcy Code l7 will halt the havoc of a race to the
courthouse by multiple plaintiffs, it is unlikely to enhance their collec
tive recovery. Typically, the liquidation of assets in chapter 7 bank
ruptcy18 nets significantly less than the value of those assets to a going
concern. Similarly, a chapter 11 proceeding 19 mandates only that tort
victims receive a distribution at least as great as they would have re
ceived under chapter 7. 20
For the business debtor, present bankruptcy alternatives are also
inadequate. Tortfeasors must choose either to liquidate under chapter
7, or to reorganize under chapter 11. Chapter 7 liquidation will gener
ally result in cessation of business activity, and will result in the forfei
ture of all business assets to the trustee for liquidation for the benefit of
creditors. 21 As presently structured, chapter 11 imposes undesirable
burdens upon business operations, and offers only limited long-tenn
relief against tort claims.
The filing of a chapter 11 petition will immediately restrain the
collection and use of cash collateral, which is defined to include cash,
deposits, accounts and receivables, in which a secured creditor may
have an interest. 22 A chapter 11 debtor generally may not sell real
estate, borrow money, or perfonn any activity outside the ordinary
course of its business, without permission of the bankruptcy court, and
then only after notice is given to some or all of the creditors. 23 Man
agement may receive only a reasonable level of compensation, usually
as approved by court order.24 The debtor must file monthly financial
reports, which become public records and which are subject to scru
tiny from the office of the United States Trustee and from creditors.2s
Furthennore, the debtor's officers must submit to periodic examina
tion from any party in interest. 26 To assist with their review of the
debtor's operations, creditors may fonn committees,27 which may in
tum petition the court for appointment of counsel.28 Counsel for a
creditor's committee are entitled to compensation from the debtor's
17. 11 u.s.c. § 362 (1988).
18. Id. §§ 701-66.
19. Id. §§ 1101-74.
20. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
21. Id. § 704.
22. Id. § 363.
23. Id. §§ 363-64.
24. Id. § 330.
25. Id. §§ 704(8), 1106(a)(I); FED. R. BANK P. 2015.
26. 11 u.s.c. § 341 (1988); FED. R. BANK P. 2004.
27. 11 u.s.c. § 1102 (1988).
28. Id. § 1103.
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estate. 29 Thus, the debtor must not only account to creditors for its
actions, but must also pay for the privilege of being scrutinized.
In a proper case, chapter 11 is an effective tool to restructure a
business having financial problems. The benefits of chapter II, how
ever, also entail burdens, such as those outlined above. For a business
that would be in a sound financial condition but for the prospect of
mass tort liability, these burdens will represent a very bitter pill.
Although chapter 11 contains counterbalancing benefits, these advan
tages are not particularly useful with respect to tort liabilities. In a
typical case, bankruptcy will stay most outstanding litigation, so that
disputed matters might be subject to resolution in the context of bank
ruptcyadministration. However, the judicial code specifies that bank
ruptcy court jurisdiction excludes personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims, and that such matters must be tried in district court. 30
Thus, chapter 11 will not preclude the cost and expense of tort
litigation.
In my view, a solution to inadequate mass tort remedies can be
found in an expanded application of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The pur
pose of this essay is not to describe all elements of such a program, but
rather, to provide a broad outline of those reforms which a viable pro
gram must ultimately incorporate. Specifically, I would recommend
legislation that adopts the following principles:
1. A new bankruptcy chapter should be created for debtors hav
ing potential mass tort liability. A petition under this chapter would
be filed either voluntarily by the tortfeasor, or involuntarily by tort
victims having claims sufficient in dollar amount and quantity.
2. A filing under this new bankruptcy chapter would impose no
restraints on the normal business operation of the tortfeasor. Unless
the case were converted to another bankruptcy chapter, the bank
ruptcy court would lack authority to appoint either a trustee or a cred
itor's committee. The debtor would not be subject to restrictions
applicable under other chapters with respect to the use of cash collat
eral, the enforcement of executory contracts, the lease or sale of prop
erty, or any other regular activity that would be permissible but for the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Activities outside the ordinary course
of business, such as a disposition of assets without consideration,
would be prohibited, however, pending confirmation of a reorganiza
tion plan.
3. The bankruptcy court would receive sole jurisdiction to de
29.
30.

Id. § 330.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988).
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termine tort liabilities. Thus, an automatic stay would apply with re
spect to tort litigation in any other forum. The legislation might also
limit various defenses, such as, for example, through a broader provi
sion for tolling statutes of limitations. In exchange for the protection
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor would accept a determination of
liability in some expedited fashion, perhaps in a way similar to proce
dures now employed to resolve workers' compensation claims.
4. The proposal would require that specific assets of the
tortfeasor be dedicated to a fund created for the satisfaction of tort
liabilities. At a minimum, this fund would include: the proceeds of
any liability insurance, a sum that fairly represents the legal expenses
which the insurance carrier would have otherwise incurred, all net
profits that are received during a pre-determined statutory period, and
possibly a portion of the debtor's net assets. Reasonable limits on the
total contribution could be calculated as a multiple or fraction of the
total net equity of the business. The contributions also would not ex
ceed those damages for which the debtor is fairly responsible. Thus,
legislation might limit a business' contribution to that payment which
would have been due if the business had been able to obtain contribu
tion from all joint tortfeasors, or if the tolling of the statute of limita
tions had been limited to some more reasonable period of time.
5. Tort claims would be satisfied from the special fund, in ac
cord only with statutory priorities for payment. Although entitled to
a priority, legal expenses would be paid only upon approval by the
court, or pursuant to reasonable schedules.
6. The court would retain equitable powers to fashion an appro
priate plan for the collection of assets and a distribution of proceeds.
If one expects adverse medical consequences to appear over many
years, for example, the court could fashion a long term arrangement
for payment of a percentage of future profits into the tort fund. Simi
larly, disbursements might be made in anticipation of future payments
into the account.
7. The various priorities would be divided into first and second
tiers. Those funds that exist in the bankrupt's special tort account
would satisfy as many priorities as possible. In the event that such
funds were inadequate, the first tier claimants would also have re
course to a national mass tort claim account. Funding for such an
account would necessarily. derive either from a tax on business enter
prises, or from general revenues. The cut-off between the first and
second tier would depend upon the level of funding that is adopted. If

"
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the legislature were to allow only for limited funding, then the first tier
of claimants would unfortunately include only a few areas of liability.
The above proposal would fulfill all of the goals set forth earlier in
this Article. First, the structure has the capacity to assure fair com
pensation to victims of mass torts. The degree of fairness, however, is
a judgment that will depend upon placement of the division between
first and second tier priorities. In all events, the proposal is fair in that
it assumes a rational distribution of limited assets in accord with pri
orities that are theoretically consistent with concepts of need.
Second, tortfeasors are obligated to pay into a fund on account of
their own conduct. A formula for payment can be set to provide con
tributions which over time will accumulate to the liquidated value of
the business at the time of bankruptcy.
Third, payment of damages will not result in destruction of the
business enterprise. Indeed, the business operations should continue
in virtually the same fashion as if a tortious incident had not occurred.
Holders of an equity interest in the business may forfeit profits, but
from the perspective of society, the benefits of continued business ac
tivity will survive. From the business' perspective, payment will be
limited to a sum which fairly reflects that business' degree of
culpability.
Fourth, the proposal will minimize transactional costs. From the
outset, it will reduce expenses paid for defending massive claims, pos
sibly spread throughout a number of jurisdictions. The proposal con
templates accelerated methods for determining liability, thereby
reducing the cost of proving a victim's claim. Moreover, for all trans
actional expenses, court review should reduce the potential for pay
ments in excess of actual costs. Finally, my proposal would explicitly
prioritize the application of limited resources for the satisfaction of
preferred claims.
Mass torts present unique problems that society is likely to en
counter with ever growing frequency. The potential magnitude of in
juries will surely test the adequacy of any sources of tort
compensation. It is imperative, therefore, that society adopt a plan
that intelligently marshals available assets for the benefit both of tort
victims and of society itself. In my judgment, such a plan can effect a
maximum recovery to the most deserving plaintiffs while still promot
ing the survival of affected business enterprises. In contrast, the status
quo invites victims to pursue remedies without regard to any overall
scheme, and at great transactional cost. Although society may be able
to afford that approach with respect to claims of limited nature, it is
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unacceptable when there are perils that are certain to leave many un
satisfied claims. I propose that society reorganize culpable enterprises
for the benefit of both society and the innocent parties who stand to
absorb the losses under the current system.

